The cybersecurity panorama witnessed a complicated and ongoing assault marketing campaign all through 2025 that has efficiently compromised main firms, together with Google, Adidas, Louis Vuitton, and quite a few different high-profile organizations.
This complete technical evaluation reveals how the infamous cybercriminal group ShinyHunters, in obvious collaboration with Scattered Spider, has executed one of the profitable social engineering campaigns concentrating on Salesforce Buyer Relationship Administration (CRM) platforms.
The marketing campaign represents a big evolution in assault sophistication, combining conventional voice phishing methods with superior OAuth abuse and API exploitation to attain persistent entry and large-scale knowledge exfiltration throughout a number of trade sectors.
ShinyHunters Salesforce Assault Marketing campaign Methodology (Supply: cybersecuritynews.com)
Background and Menace Actor Attribution
Evolution from Database Thieves to Social Engineers
ShinyHunters emerged in 2020 as a financially motivated cybercriminal group initially targeted on conventional credential theft and database exploitation.
The group gained notoriety by way of high-profile knowledge breaches affecting main platforms, together with Tokopedia (91 million information), Microsoft GitHub (500GB of knowledge), and AT&T (70+ million information).
Past knowledge theft operations, ShinyHunters established itself as a key participant within the cybercriminal ecosystem by serving as directors of widespread hacking boards, together with a number of incarnations of BreachForums.
Following arrests of a number of alleged members in June 2024, ShinyHunters maintained relative inactivity till their dramatic resurgence in June 2025 with essentially remodeled techniques, methods, and procedures (TTPs).
Google’s Menace Intelligence Group (GTIG) tracks the present marketing campaign actions beneath the designations UNC6040 (preliminary compromise actions) and UNC6240 (extortion operations), although the operators constantly declare affiliation with the ShinyHunters model.
Suspected Collaboration with Scattered Spider
Compelling circumstantial proof suggests energetic collaboration between ShinyHunters and Scattered Spider, a complicated English-speaking cybercriminal collective recognized for social engineering experience. This collaboration idea is supported by a number of key indicators
Tactical Convergence: The present ShinyHunters marketing campaign demonstrates marked adoption of Scattered Spider’s signature methods, together with extremely focused voice phishing, area impersonation patterns, and VPN obfuscation strategies.
Infrastructure Overlap: Area registration evaluation reveals shared infrastructure traits, together with comparable naming conventions (ticket-companyname[.]com), widespread registrars (GMO Web), and Cloudflare-masked nameservers.
Attribution Proof: A BreachForums consumer with the portmanteau alias “Sp1d3rhunters” appeared in Could 2024, claiming each teams “are the identical” and “have all the time been the identical,” whereas subsequently leaking knowledge beforehand attributed to ShinyHunters.
Each teams display connections to “The Com,” a loosely organized collective of English-speaking cybercriminals engaged in various unlawful actions, together with SIM swapping, account takeovers, cryptocurrency theft, and extra excessive felony actions.
ShinyHunters and Scattered Spider Collaboration (Click on to enlarge) (Supply: cybersecuritynews.com)
Technical Assault Methodology
Preliminary Entry: Voice Phishing (Vishing) Operations
The assault chain begins with subtle voice phishing campaigns concentrating on staff with acceptable Salesforce permissions. Attackers impersonate inner IT assist personnel utilizing a number of social engineering methods:
Reconnaissance Section: Menace actors conduct in depth open-source intelligence gathering, harvesting worker contact info from LinkedIn, firm directories, and public sources to establish high-value targets with Salesforce administrative privileges.
Name Initiation: Attackers provoke calls utilizing spoofed caller IDs, voice-altering software program, and professional-sounding scripts claiming pressing Salesforce-related points requiring fast consideration. Some campaigns make use of automated telephone programs with pre-recorded messages and interactive menus to collect extra reconnaissance earlier than connecting to dwell operators.
Belief Institution: The social engineering strategy exploits inherent belief relationships between staff and IT assist, leveraging urgency and authority to bypass regular verification procedures.
OAuth Abuse: Malicious Linked App Authorization
The core technical exploit facilities on manipulating Salesforce’s OAuth-based linked app authorization mechanism:
ShinyHunters Salesforce OAuth Abuse Assault (Supply: cybersecuritynews.com)
Linked App Setup Manipulation: Throughout vishing calls, attackers information victims to Salesforce’s linked app authorization web page (sometimes login.salesforce.com/setup/join), instructing them to authorize what seems to be authentic software program.
Malicious Software Deployment: The menace actors current modified variations of Salesforce’s authentic Information Loader software, usually rebranded with deceptive names resembling “My Ticket Portal” to align with social engineering pretexts. These functions request broad API permissions, together with knowledge export capabilities.
8-Digit Authorization Code: Victims enter attacker-provided 8-digit authorization codes, inadvertently granting persistent OAuth tokens with in depth API entry permissions. This course of bypasses multi-factor authentication necessities and establishes long-term entry with out triggering normal safety alerts.
Linked App ID: Evaluation of Salesforce Occasion Monitoring logs revealed the malicious Linked App ID 889Kb100000KFJc related to suspicious knowledge exfiltration actions. This identifier represents unauthorized functions performing large-volume knowledge queries throughout a number of sufferer organizations.
Information Exfiltration: API Exploitation and Automation
As soon as OAuth entry is established, menace actors deploy subtle knowledge extraction methods:
REST API Exploitation: Attackers make the most of Salesforce’s authentic REST API endpoint /providers/knowledge/v62.0/question to carry out bulk SOQL (Salesforce Object Question Language) queries concentrating on high-value knowledge objects.
Automated Extraction Scripts: GTIG noticed evolution from authentic Information Loader functions to customized Python scripts performing comparable features however with enhanced automation capabilities. These scripts allow fast, large-scale knowledge extraction whereas mimicking authentic API utilization patterns.
Information Quantity and Concentrating on: Every extraction request sometimes retrieves roughly 2.3 MB of knowledge, with assaults specializing in Contact objects containing 400+ fields per report. Attackers display a complicated understanding of Salesforce knowledge constructions, concentrating on buyer databases, personally identifiable info (PII), and enterprise intelligence.
Site visitors Obfuscation: All knowledge exfiltration actions route by way of Mullvad VPN IP addresses and Tor networks to complicate attribution and evade detection. This multi-layered obfuscation strategy considerably hampers incident response and forensic evaluation efforts.
Lateral Motion and Privilege Escalation
Following preliminary Salesforce compromise, attackers steadily try lateral motion to adjoining cloud platforms:
Credential Harvesting: Utilizing harvested credentials and OAuth tokens, menace actors entry built-in platforms together with Okta, Microsoft 365, and Meta Office.
Cross-Platform Information Entry: Attackers leverage single sign-on (SSO) relationships and shared authentication mechanisms to entry SharePoint repositories, e-mail programs, and extra knowledge shops.
Privilege Escalation: By way of social engineering and credential manipulation, attackers could escalate entry privileges inside goal organizations, doubtlessly gaining administrative rights to extra programs.
Complete Techniques, Methods, and Procedures (TTPs)
The next desk supplies an in depth mapping of noticed ShinyHunters TTPs to the MITRE ATT&CK framework:
TacticTechnique IDTechnique NameDescriptionObserved BehaviorReconnaissanceT1589.001Gather Sufferer Identification Info: CredentialsGathering goal worker credentials and get in touch with info for vishing campaignsResearching goal staff by way of LinkedIn, firm directoriesReconnaissanceT1589.002Gather Sufferer Identification Info: Electronic mail AddressesCollecting e-mail addresses of goal group employeesHarvesting company e-mail addresses from public sourcesInitial AccessT1566.004Phishing: Spear Phishing VoiceVoice phishing calls impersonating IT assist personnel to trick victimsImpersonating inner IT assist with convincing social engineeringInitial AccessT1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud AccountsAbusing authentic Salesforce accounts by way of social engineeringLeveraging compromised consumer accounts with acceptable Salesforce permissionsInitial AccessT1199Trusted RelationshipExploiting belief relationship between customers and IT assist by way of telephone callsExploiting inherent belief in IT assist relationshipsExecutionT1059.006Command and Scripting Interpreter: PythonCustom Python scripts changing Salesforce Information Loader for automated exfiltrationDeploying customized Python scripts for automated bulk knowledge extractionPersistenceT1098.001Account Manipulation: Extra Cloud CredentialsCreating malicious OAuth functions disguised as authentic Salesforce toolsRegistering apps named “”My Ticket Portal”” to seem legitimateCredential AccessT1528Steal Software Entry TokenStealing OAuth tokens by way of malicious linked app authorizationObtaining persistent API entry by way of OAuth app authorizationCredential AccessT1621Multi-Issue Authentication Request GenerationTricking customers into approving MFA requests throughout vishing callsRequesting MFA approval throughout faux IT assist calls
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
IoC TypeIndicatorCategoryDescriptionConfidenceFirst ObservedStatusEmail Addressshinycorp@tuta[.]comCommunicationPrimary extortion e-mail utilized by UNC6240 for ransom demandsHigh2025-06-01ActiveEmail Addressshinygroup@tuta[.]comCommunicationSecondary extortion e-mail tackle utilized by menace actorsHigh2025-06-01ActiveDomaindashboard-salesforce[.]comInfrastructureActive phishing area internet hosting faux Salesforce login pagesHigh2025-08-01ActiveDomainticket-dior[.]comInfrastructurePhishing area impersonating Dior for ticket-themed attacksHigh2025-06-20InactiveDomainticket-lvmh[.]comInfrastructurePhishing area concentrating on LVMH with ticket portal themeHigh2025-06-20InactiveDomainticket-louisvuitton[.]comInfrastructureDomain impersonating Louis Vuitton for credential harvestingHigh2025-06-20InactiveDomainticket-nike[.]comInfrastructurePhishing area concentrating on Nike with ticket dashboard themeHigh2025-06-26InactiveDomainticket-audemarspiguet[.]comInfrastructureDomain impersonating Audemars Piguet for social engineeringHigh2025-06-20InactiveDomain*-my-salesforce[.]comInfrastructure PatternPattern for company-specific Salesforce phishing domainsMedium2025-06-01ActiveDomain*-ticket[.]comInfrastructure PatternPattern for ticket-themed phishing concentrating on luxurious brandsMedium2025-06-01ActiveConnected App ID889Kb100000KFJcApplicationMalicious Linked App ID noticed in Salesforce logsHigh2025-06-15BlockedUser AgentSalesforceDataLoader/*NetworkUser agent string related to malicious Information Loader variantsMedium2025-06-01MonitoredAPI Endpoint/providers/knowledge/v62.0/queryNetworkSalesforce REST API endpoint used for bulk knowledge queriesHigh2025-06-01MonitoredIP RangeMullvad VPN IP RangesNetworkVPN service used for site visitors obfuscation and anonymityMedium2025-06-01Active
Safety analysts ought to monitor for the next complete set of indicators related to the ShinyHunters Salesforce marketing campaign:
Sufferer Influence Evaluation
The marketing campaign has affected organizations throughout a number of trade sectors, with confirmed and suspected victims spanning expertise, luxurious items, aviation, insurance coverage, and retail:
OrganizationIndustryBreach DateConfirmation StatusData CompromisedResponse ActionsGoogleTechnologyJune 2025Confirmed by GoogleSMB contact info, enterprise names, telephone numbersAccess terminated, prospects notified, evaluation completedAdidasRetail/FashionJuly 2025Media ReportsCustomer knowledge, inner communicationsInvestigation ongoing, safety measures implementedLouis Vuitton (LVMH)Luxurious GoodsJuly 2025Media ReportsCustomer databases, PIIBreach investigation, buyer notificationDior (LVMH)Luxurious GoodsJuly 2025Media ReportsCustomer information, transaction dataIncident response activated, forensic analysisChanelLuxury GoodsAugust 2025Media ReportsUS buyer databaseData breach disclosure, buyer alertsQantas AirwaysAviationJuly 2025Media ReportsPassenger knowledge, reserving informationPayment made, investigation ongoingAllianz LifeInsuranceJuly 2025Media ReportsPolicy holder informationSecurity evaluate, coverage updatesCisco SystemsTechnologyJune 2025Media ReportsInternal communications, buyer dataIncident containment, safety hardening
Excessive-Profile Confirmed Breaches
Google (June 2025): Google confirmed a compromise of a company Salesforce occasion containing contact info for small and medium companies. Roughly 2.55 million information have been allegedly accessed, together with enterprise names, telephone numbers, and gross sales notes. Google responded quickly, terminating attacker entry and finishing buyer notifications by August 8, 2025.
LVMH Luxurious Manufacturers: A number of LVMH subsidiaries have been focused, together with Louis Vuitton, Dior, and Tiffany & Co. Area registration proof reveals ticket-themed phishing infrastructure particularly concentrating on these manufacturers between June 20-30, 2025, coinciding with reported knowledge breaches.
Aviation Sector: Qantas Airways reportedly paid 4 Bitcoin (~$400,000) to forestall knowledge leakage, whereas Air France-KLM additionally suffered confirmed breaches. These assaults display the marketing campaign’s effectiveness throughout worldwide aviation firms with substantial buyer databases.
Extortion and Monetization
The ShinyHunters marketing campaign employs a delayed extortion mannequin, with ransom calls for occurring weeks or months after preliminary knowledge theft. Key traits embrace:
Ransom Quantities: Calls for vary from 4 Bitcoin (~$400,000) to twenty Bitcoin (~$2.3 million), with Google receiving the best reported demand (although claimed as a joke by the attackers).
Information Leak Website Preparation: GTIG warns that ShinyHunters could also be getting ready to escalate techniques by launching a devoted knowledge leak web site (DLS) to extend strain on victims.
Infrastructure Evaluation and Area Patterns
Complete evaluation of malicious infrastructure reveals coordinated area registration patterns supporting the attribution of this marketing campaign to ShinyHunters in collaboration with Scattered Spider:
Ticket-Themed Phishing Domains
ReliaQuest researchers recognized a number of malicious domains registered between June and August 2025 following constant naming patterns:
LVMH Concentrating on: ticket-lvmh[.]com, ticket-dior[.]com, ticket-louisvuitton[.]com (registered June 20-30, 2025)Prolonged Concentrating on: ticket-nike[.]com, ticket-audemarspiguet[.]com (registered June 2025)Salesforce Impersonation: dashboard-salesforce[.]com (registered August 1, 2025, actively internet hosting phishing pages)
Registry Traits
All recognized malicious domains share widespread infrastructure indicators:
Registrar: GMO Web is constantly used throughout malicious infrastructure.Electronic mail Patterns: Short-term registrant addresses utilizing mailshan[.]com area.DNS Configuration: Cloudflare-masked nameservers to obscure true internet hosting infrastructure.Phishing Kits: Domains host Okta-branded phishing pages mimicking authentic SSO portals.
Technical Countermeasures and Detection Methods
Salesforce-Particular Protections
Organizations should implement complete Salesforce safety hardening measures:
Linked App Administration: Prohibit highly effective permissions together with “API Enabled” and “Handle Linked Apps” to important administrative personnel solely. Implement common audits of licensed linked functions and take away unused or suspicious entries.
IP Allowlisting: Implement IP tackle restrictions for consumer profiles and linked app insurance policies to forestall entry from surprising or non-corporate IP addresses. This measure particularly counters VPN-based obfuscation methods noticed within the marketing campaign.
Occasion Monitoring: Deploy Salesforce Defend with Transaction Safety Insurance policies to watch massive knowledge downloads and weird API exercise patterns. Automated alerts ought to set off on bulk Contact object queries exceeding regular utilization baselines.
OAuth Governance: Implement strict approval processes for linked app installations, doubtlessly allowlisting recognized secure functions to forestall unauthorized OAuth grants.
Detection and Monitoring
Safety operations facilities ought to implement the next detection capabilities:
Behavioral Evaluation: Monitor for uncommon REST API request volumes, significantly bulk queries to Contact objects returning constant knowledge sizes (~2.3MB). Set up baselines for regular API utilization and alert on statistical anomalies.
Community Site visitors Evaluation: Detect connections to Mullvad VPN IP ranges and Tor exit nodes originating from company networks. Correlation of VPN utilization with Salesforce API exercise ought to set off fast investigation.
Social Engineering Indicators: Monitor for uncommon 8-digit authorization codes in Salesforce logs and examine OAuth app authorizations from unknown IP addresses.
Area Intelligence: Implement automated monitoring for newly registered domains following noticed patterns (ticket-companyname[.]com, companyname-salesforce[.]com) to establish concentrating on infrastructure.
The ShinyHunters Salesforce assault marketing campaign represents one of the subtle and profitable social engineering operations noticed in recent times, efficiently compromising dozens of high-profile organizations throughout a number of industries.
The suspected collaboration between ShinyHunters and Scattered Spider has produced a hybrid menace actor with enhanced capabilities, combining conventional knowledge theft experience with superior social engineering methods.
The marketing campaign’s technical sophistication lies not in novel exploitation methods however within the masterful mixture of human psychology, authentic platform options, and superior obfuscation strategies.
By abusing OAuth mechanisms and exploiting belief relationships, the menace actors achieved persistent entry to delicate buyer knowledge throughout quite a few organizations whereas evading conventional technical safety controls.
For cybersecurity professionals, this marketing campaign underscores the crucial significance of addressing human components in safety architectures. Whereas technical controls stay important, probably the most subtle defenses show insufficient when customers could be manipulated into authorizing malicious functions by way of convincing social engineering.
Organizations should undertake complete protection methods combining restrictive OAuth governance, enhanced consumer schooling, behavioral monitoring, and incident response capabilities particularly designed to counter social engineering threats.
The continued evolution of this marketing campaign, potential regulation enforcement disruption efforts, and suspected growth into ransomware operations would require sustained vigilance and adaptive safety measures throughout all trade sectors.
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